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of Law, he summarized his view that the TEAM Act1 would compound rather than solve that problem and presented his own perception of related shortcomings under present law.2 His comments
provide a valuable frame of reference for critical questions posed
by the prospect of establishing employee representation structures
that might function as legal alternatives to traditional labor unions.
I am fully in agreement with Chairman Gould's assessment of the
TEAM Act, though I believe his restatement of existing law,
notwithstanding that it reflects conventional wisdom on the subject,
requires significant modification. I am indebted to him, however,
for having raised the right questions about the law. The simulated
dialogue that follows, consisting of verbatim excerpts from his
Creighton presentation and my own responses, presents the legal
parameters that I consider basic for the creation and operation of
any form of alternative employee representation.
The dialogue begins.
Gould:
My view is that the dignity of work can best be realized through
some form of representation or involvement by employees at the
workplace. 3

Morris:
Your emphasis on dignity of work is well placed, because pride in
one's work is indeed important to the human process as well as to
the production process. If employees are to have an effective voice
in the typical workplace, representation is essential, therefore this is
an ideal concept with which to begin our discussion.
Gould:
The TEAM Act... should be called the Employee Domination
Act since it would allow employers to impose representational
arrangements ..

. upon employees regardless of their wishes,

appointing the workers' representatives for them, determining
what issues should be taken up, and what the structure of the
system would be.
1. Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995, H.R. 743 and S. 295, 104th
Cong.
2. See William B. Gould IV, Employee ParticipationandLabor Policy: Why the TEAM

Act Should be Defeated and the National Labor Relations Act Amended, 30 CRaIGHTON L.
Rnv. 3 (1996) (The seminar was presented in Omaha, Nebraska, on June 7, 1996).
3. Id. at 6.
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The TEAM Act is contrary to the democratic assumptions of
America's society which presuppose our ability and basic right to
select representatives of our own choosing-assumptions which
ought to be applicable to the employment relationship.4

Morris:
I could not agree with you more. From its inception as a hastily

drafted response to the Labor Board's Electromation5 decision, it
was apparent that the TEAM Act would effectively repeal section

8(a)(2)6 and provide a legal means for employers to give "employees the illusion of a bargaining representative without the reality of
one."7 Passage of the TEAM Act would effect a substantial change

in the American system of labor law, dramatically altering the democratic principle contained in the NLRA that allows employees to
decide for themselves whether they desire to join a union or some
other form of labor organization, who their representatives will be,
and whether they even wish to be represented.8 The TEAM Act
would permit substitution of an authoritarian model under which
the employer can mandate employee representation and dictate the
selection of the employees' representatives.9
Gould:
Notwithstanding the flawed nature of the TEAM Act, the
National Labor Relations Act is badly in need of revision ....
[T]he need [is] to provide for a more level playing field between
unions and employers as they compete in the marketplace of
ideas for the allegiance of workers in organizational campaigns.
The lawfulness of employee committees in a nonunion environment is important as well. Congress can and should do more to

4. IL at 8. In a May 9, 1997 letter to Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chairman Gould said
the NLRA should be amended to "allow employers to sponsor and financially assist
employee organizations in nonunion establishments without any limitation .... NLRB
Chairman Gould Repeats His Opposition to TEAM Act, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) May 13,
1996, at A-6.
5. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), affd, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994). See Charles J. Morris, Will There be a New Direction
for American IndustrialRelations?-A HardLook at the Team Bill, the Sawyer Substitute Bill,
and the Employee Involvement Bill, 47 LAB. L.J. 89, 90 (1996).
7. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 1003 (Devaney, concurring).
8. See Morris, supra note 6, at 92-93.
9. See Morris, supra note 6, at 92-93.
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build the bridge of communication between such employees and
10
employers.

Morris:

Yes, the NLRA could and should be improved to make its
processes more effective in order to achieve the level playing field

to which you refer. I question, however whether there is a need to
amend the Act to establish the lawfulness of employee committees
in the nonunion workplace. The present Act already permits a
wide range of lawful employee committees. The Labor Board's
General Foods Corp." and Sears, Roebuck & Co." decisions

affirmed that employee committees in which employees participate
in day-to-day decision-making or in communications concerning
their work are not labor organizations within the meaning of section 2(5). 1 And as for employee committees that deal with the
employer regarding compensation and other conditions of employment, the Act clearly allows such committees when they are genuinely representative of the employees and not controlled by the
10. Gould, supra note 2, at 9. Chairman Gould has continued to press for an
amendment to § 8(a)(2). In August 1997, he advocated the following as part of a package of
recommended NLRA reforms:
Amend 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act to allow and encourage
employee participation in nonunion workplaces so long as it is not designed to
forestall or supplant collective bargaining and so long as it permits genuine
employee participation free from domination by the employer. This will help assure
U.S. industry's competitiveness in the global economy and allow employees to
contribute their ideas to the success of their enterprises without undermining
collective bargaining.
Ralph E. Deeds, Jr. & William B. Gould IV, 50 Years of U.S. Labor Law and Industrial
Relations Development, in PERspcErvEs ON WORK, Vol. 1. No. 2, 36, 39 (1997).
11. 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977) (holding that teamwork type programs involving
employees in the production process are not prohibited by § 8(a)(2)).
12. 274 N.L.R.B. 230, 244 (1985) (holding that a communications committee that is not
an advocate for employees, but a tool to increase efficiency, is not a labor organization within
the meaning of § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5)); see also Vons Grocery Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 53 (1995)
(holding that an employee participation group that does not have a "pattern or practice" of
making proposals to management cannot be transferred into a statutory labor organization).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
The term 'labor organization' means any organization of any kind, or any agency or
employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
conditions of work.
Id. See Charles J. Morris, Dbdi Vu and 8(a)(2): What's Really Being Chilled by Electromation?, 4 CORNELL J.L. & Pun. PoL'y 25, 27-28 (1994).
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employer-conditions that you agree ought to be deemed essential
in a democratic system.1 4

Gould:
[In a] bizarre way, the Act makes it unlawful to dominate or
assist an organization
that is concerned with employment
5
conditions.'

Morris:
I suspect you are not really objecting to the prohibition of
employer domination. It certainly is not bizarre to prohibit an
employer from dominating, i.e., controlling, a labor organization
that is supposed to be the free and voluntary voice of the employees. But whether it is bizarre to prohibit an employer's assistance
to such an organization is another matter. It depends on the nature
of the assistance. Present statutory language and applicable case
law recognize that there is a fine but perceptible line between
assistance in the nature of cooperation and assistance that unduly
interferes with employee freedom of action and decision-making.1 6
And, notwithstanding certain allegations that purported to express
conventional wisdom during the TEAM Act debates, 17 the tests
which the Board and courts have developed to distinguish lawful
cooperation from unlawful influence are now firmly established.
Indeed, the law has been exceptionally clear on these issues for
many years, as I shall spell out later in this dialogue.
Gould:
The principal deficiency of the current law lies in its ambiguity.
First, while the Act prohibits "financial" assistance or other
"support," these terms are not self-defining. Literally, if an
employer were to grant an employee committee the use of plant
facilities, such as copying machines and meeting rooms, it would
run afoul of the
statute-although it is unusual to find a violation
8
on this basis.'

14. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
15. Gould, supra, note 2, at 9.
16. See, e.g., Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992).
17. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. S7469-70 (daily ed. Jul. 9, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kassenbaum).
18. Gould, supra note 2, at 9.
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Morris:
I would go further and say that it would be impossible rather than
unusual to find a violation on that basis, absent other critical factors. In situations where the labor organization belongs to the
employees and is not controlled by the employer, the employer is
free to cooperate in a variety of ways, such as providing "the use of
plant facilities such as copying machines[,] and meeting rooms," 19
and much more, even compensation to union members and
employee representatives for their time spent in representational
activities. You presumably believe that there is nevertheless some
danger that the statutory phrase "contribute financial or other support" might be applied in a manner which neither the Board nor the
courts have ever contemplated, or which Congress, by its use of the
limiting term "support" never intended.2" I say presumably,
because in an earlier presentation about this issue you argued that
"the NLRA's strict prohibitions against financial and other forms of
assistance, as well as domination, makes repeal of section 8(a)(2) a
desirable objective."' 21 That seems an odd assessment of the
existing state of the law, for numerous Board decisions make it
abundantly clear that there is no strict prohibition against an
employer providing financial or other forms of assistance to
employees' labor organizations, for the cases clearly hold that such
contributions are not per se violative of the Act. The prohibition in
section 8(a)(2) applies only to financial and other support, not to
cooperation, as the Seventh Circuit explained in its Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB 22 decision:
"Support" is proscribed because, as a practical matter, it cannot
be separated from influence. A line must be drawn, however,
between support and cooperation. Support, even though innocent, can be identified because it constitutes at least some degree
of control or influence. Cooperation only assists the employees
or their bargaining representative in carrying out their independent intention. If this line between cooperation and support is not
recognized, the employer's fear of accusations of domination
19. Gould, supra note 2, at 9.
20. Gould, supra note 2, at 9.
21. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT

RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 140 (MIT Press 1993) (emphasis added).
22. 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'g 105 N.L.R.B. 727 (1953).
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may defeat the principal purpose 23
of the Act, which is cooperation
between management and labor.
As I shall demonstrate later, in response to your specific comments about Chicago Rawhide, the Board has long understood and
regularly applied the distinction to which the Seventh Circuit
referred.2 4
I am still troubled, however, that you feel that the "principal deficiency of the current law lies in its ambiguity."' The NLRA certainly has its deficiencies, but the least of them, in my opinion, is
ambiguity. Nevertheless, to the extent that any ambiguity may
exist, the advantage lies with the Board in its effort to interpret the
statute in accordance with Congressional policy. This conclusion
was reconfirmed by the Supreme Court in Holly Farms Corp. v.
NLRB 26 when it invoked the two-step Chevron27 test to define the
role of the courts in reviewing the Board's interpretation of the
NLRA:
If a statute's meaning is plain, the Board and the reviewing courts
"must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." . . . When the legislative prescription is not free from
ambiguity, the administrator must choose between conflicting
reasonable interpretations. Courts, in turn, must respect the
judgment of the agency empowered to apply the law "to varying
fact patterns" . . . even if the issue "with nearly equal reason
[might] be resolved one way rather than another ....
And in NLRB v. Webcor Packaging,Inc.2 9 the Sixth Circuit, which
had previously been the least accommodating of all the Circuits in
reviewing the Board's section 8(a)(2) decisions, acknowledged, on
the basis of Holly Farms, that it had been applying inconsistent
standards in its review of the Board's interpretations of the Act,
23. Id. at 167.
24. See, e.g., Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1116-19 (1995);
Hannaford Bros. Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1100, 1101 (1957).
25. Gould, supra note 2, at 9.
26. 517 U.S. 392 (1996).
27. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
28. Holly Farms, 517 U.S. at 398-99 (citations omitted); see also NLRB v. United Food
& Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) ("[W]e have traditionally accorded the
Board deference with regard to its interpretation of the NLRA as long as its interpretation is
rational and consistent with the statute.").
29. 118 F.3d 1115 (6th Cir. 1997), enforcing 319 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1995).
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and therefore any conflicting decisions were now "effectively overruled" by that case.30
Your charge of statutory ambiguity thus overlooks the Board's
authority to exercise its expertise in clarifying any statutory phrase
where the meaning is in question. Regarding the language to which
you referred, in the cases that I shall shortly note, the Board has
already accomplished the clarification you seek;31 and in future
cases, or possibly through rulemaking, it may further clarify this
area of the law. However, before examining the case law that has
evolved during several decades of statutory application, I want to
pause upon the bare language of the provision, especially its proviso. 2 Regrettably, that proviso has been largely ignored by the
Board, and as a consequence, also by the courts. Note the full text
of section 8(a)(2), with the proviso, which both defines and limits
the pertinent unfair labor practices:
8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer...
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration
of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support
to it: Provided, that, subject to rules and regulations made and
published by the Board pursuant to section 6, an employer shall
not be prohibitedfrom permitting employees to confer with him
during working hours without loss of time orpay.3 3

The opening phrase of the subsection, which contains the basic
prohibitions against employer domination, interference, formation,

administration,and support, is treated in the review of case law that
follows.3 4 It is the proviso, however, that now merits attention.
This proviso was inserted in the final draft of the Wagner Act for
the reasons spelled out in the Senate Report. 5 That Report noted
first that:
The committee feels justified, particularly in view of statutory
precedents, in outlawing financial or other support as a form of
unfair pressure. It seems clear that an organization or a repre30. See ii. at 1119. In Webcor, the Circuit affirmed the Board's finding that the
employer had dominated the employees committee that it had created. See id. at 1124.
31. See infra notes 54-105 and accompanying text.
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added) (The reference to section 6 in the text
refers to 29 U.S.C. § 156.).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 49-97 & 102-42,
35. See S. REP. No. 573, on S. 1958 (1935).
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sentative or agent paid by the employer for representing employees cannot command, even if deserving it, the full confidence of
such employees. And friendly labor relations depend upon absolute6 confidence on the part of each side in those who represent
3

it.

It then explained the limitation on the foregoing, which was that
... the committee has been extremely careful not to work injustice by carrying these strictures too far. To deny absolutely by law
the right of employees to confer with management during working
hours without loss of time or pay would interruptthe very negotiations which it is the object of this bill to promote. For these reasons, there is attached to the second unfair labor practice the...
proviso ....
This proviso is surrounded by adequate safeguards. . . . [Its]
entirety is made subject to the rules and regulationsof the Board,
thus enabling the Board to confine it to whatever extent may be
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the bill.37
Congress thus intended that where a labor organization is
independent and free from unlawful employer influence, the
employees would be permitted to engage in representational activities in their dealings with their employer while they received their
regular pay, and such payments would not be treated as unlawful
financial support of the labor organization by the employer." And
to make doubly certain that this right would be administered rationally, Congress specifically provided the safeguard of administrative
rulemaking.3 9 The Board, however, has never exercised that
rulemaking authority,4 nor has it provided specific guideline rules
through the adjudicatory process.
In an early case, Remington Arms Co., Inc.,4" the Board expressly
noted the applicability of the proviso, and in 1979 it again referred
to it in Janesville ProductsDivision, Amtel, Inc.42 But in most cases
involving employee compensation for time engaged in labor rela36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See generally American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991) (confirming the
Board's authority to issue substantive rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 553, even without the specificity of authority contained in § 8(a)(2)).

41. 62 N.L.R.B. 611, 614 (1945).
42. 240 N.L.R.B. 854, 858 (1979).
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tions activity, the Board has not explicitly referred to the proviso. 43
That is unfortunate, for this is the only unfair labor practice provision in the entire Act that contains a specific direction for issuance
of "rules and regulations pursuant to section 6." True, under the
authority of NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,44 "[t]he NLRB is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding, and the choice between rulemaking and adjudication initially
lies within the NLRB's discretion."45 Nevertheless, the Board
could have used-and can still use-section 6 rulemaking to great
advantage in this area, for it would thereby assure its constituents in
the labor relations community that an employer can safely pay for
all the time that employees invest in the labor-management process
through their lawfully recognized independent labor organization.
If that organization is not dominated or unlawfully supported by
the employer, such payments constitute elements of lawful cooperation. As will be observed in the discussion that follows, the case law
already permits such payments, but the Board, pursuant to explicit
language in existing law, could do more to spell out the permissible
extent of this type of cooperation.46 New legislation on the point
would be superfluous.
Gould:
In my ... Keeler Brass4 7 ... concurring opinion... I expressed
my view that the ... Seventh Circuit in Chicago Rawhide ... was

correct in its holding. In that case, the committee in question
originated with the employees and met outside the presence of
management. Management did not determine the subject matter
to be considered and did not determine who would be on the
committee or have veto power over any committee recommendations. These
facts established the independence of the
48
committees.

43. See infra text accompanying notes 57-105 (discussing the post-Chicago Rawhide

cases).
44. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).

45. Id. at 268.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 48-103 (discussing the post-Chicago Rawhide
cases).
47. Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995).
48. William B. Gould IV, Employee ParticipationandLabor Policy: Why the TEAM Act
Should be Defeated and the NationalLabor Relations Act Amended, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV.
3, 10 (1996); see Keeler Brass, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1116-19.
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Morris:
In your reference to Chicago Rawhide in the Keeler Brass concurring opinion, you carefully noted the Seventh Circuit's error-later
corrected by that court when it affirmed the Board's Electromation
decision-in holding that "'[t]he test of whether an employee
organization is employer controlled is not an objective one but
rather subjective from the standpoint of the employees."' 49 That
feature of the court's Chicago Rawhide opinion was therefore never
embraced by you. But as to the other features in the opinion, I do
not understand why you treat the case as if it does not represent
established Board law,5" for the Circuit's opinion in that case is
clearly the settled and existing law. It is true that the Board is often
reluctant to admit that it has made a mistake, at least without the
Supreme Court's prompting of such an admission. But as we both
know, sometimes the Board chooses, consciously or otherwise, to
correct a mistake without fully crediting the source of its shift in
direction. In Chicago Rawhide, the Board did find a violation in the
fact situation that you described, but immediately following its
reversal by the Circuit it began to correct that error and continued
to do so in almost all of the subsequent cases involving similar fact
patterns. 51 The contrary cases-of which I count only two 5 2--both
occurred during the early years following the Seventh Circuit's
49. Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 168 (7th Cir. 1955) (quoting

from NLRB v. Sharples Chems., 209 F.2d 645, 652 (6th Cir. 1994)). In its Electromation
decision, the Seventh Circuit recognized that

[A]n interpretation of section 8(a)(2) which would limit a court's focus to only the
employees' subjective will, or which would require a finding of employee

dissatisfaction with the organization, is at odds with the Supreme Court's holding in
NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 249 (1939)

To focus exclusively on employee subjective reactions in order to demonstrate a

section 8(a)(2) violation would... contravene the purpose of the Act. It is entirely
possible that an extremely well constructed employer-dominated labor organization
could be so "camouflaged" as to persuade employees that it represented their best
interests and preserved their free choice when in fact it did not.

Electromation, Inc., 35 F.3d 1148, 1167-68 (7th Cir. 1994).
50. See, e.g., Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1117 (1995)
(Concurring in the Keeler Brass opinion, Chairman Gould asserted that the Chicago Rawhide

standard was "different from that used by the Board for determining whether the employer's
conduct violated section 8(a)(2)" and that he was accordingly adopting "the court's approach

in this decision.").
51. See infra text accompanying notes 57-105 (discussing the post-Chicago Rawhide

cases).
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decision (hereinafter referred to generically as Chicago Rawhide)
and none occurred after 1966; but even during that early period, the
Board decided five other cases consistent with Chicago Rawhide. 3
Ultimately, and within a short period of time, it adopted the very
test that the Seventh Circuit had enunciated, sometimes with specific attribution to the Circuit's decision but more often by merely
citing its own post-Chicago Rawhide cases. Regardless, in at least
fifteen cases involving employers that had provided financial and
other forms of assistance to labor organizations, all of which cases
are noted below, the Board applied the same Chicago Rawhide
rationale that you enunciated in your Keeler Brass concurrence,
treating such assistance as lawful cooperation rather than unlawful
support, therefore finding no violation of section 8(a)(2) based on
such conduct. And in no less than four of those cases, the Board
specifically cited and credited the Seventh Circuit's decision.
Chicago Rawhide, consequently, provides no reason to amend
statutory language, the meaning of which has been long understood. To emphasize, however, that such language and interpretative case law furnish clear and practicable guidelines that
demonstrate positively how an employer can lawfully contribute
financial and other support to an in-house labor organization, I
shall review all of these post-Chicago Rawhide Board decisions.
Note that these are decisions of the Board, not appellate court
52. See Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201, 202-03 (6th Cir. 1967), rev'g 155
N.L.R.B. 1126 (1966) (employer paid committee members their regular wages when
attending meetings, prepared the committee's ballots, and paid for food and drinks when
meetings were held at an outside cafd); NLRB v. Post Publ'g Co., 311 F.2d 565, 568-69 (7th
Cir. 1962), rev'g 136 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1962) (the Board indicated that standing alone, use of
company property for union meetings and permitting use of the employer's machines for
printing union notices would not constitute unlawful support, but coupled with the
employer's allowing the union to receive the profits from the employees' cafeteria and coffee
vending machine, it found a violation; the 7th Circuit reversed, deeming all such conduct to
be permissible forms of friendly cooperation).
There are three additional cases where the Board was reversed: Hertzka & Knowles v,
NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915 (6th Cir.
1968); and Coppus Eng'g Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957). At first blush these
cases might appear to be contra to Chicago Rawhide, but they are clearly not, for in addition
to the employers' having provided a place for meetings, payment of wages to employees for
their meeting time, and other friendly assistance, there was evidence in all three cases of
unlawful employer intrusion into the labor organization's internal affairs-notwithstanding
the appellate courts' contrary determinations. But compare NLRB v. Keller Ladders S., Inc.,
405 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1968), and NLRB v. Summers Fertilizer Co., 251 F.2d 514 (1st Cir.
1958), where other Circuits enforced similar Board decisions.
53. See infra notes 57, 65, 69, 72 & 74 and accompanying text.
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reversals of the Board, hence they unquestionably represent established Board law.
First, the pertinent facts of Chicago Rawhide. The "cooperation"
which the Seventh Circuit approved consisted of (1) allowing the
election of personnel and shop committeemen of the "Employees
Committees" to be conducted on company time and premises, (2)
allowing those committees to use company bulletin boards, (3) permitting the committees to transact their business on company premises, (4) allowing the processing of grievances on company time,
and (5) allowing the company to contribute financial support to a
recreational committee that was connected to the Employees Committees.54 In reversing the Board's finding that the employer had
violated section 8(a)(2) by "supporting, assisting and interfering"
with the Employees Committees,5" the Circuit explained that the
acts complained of showed only "laudable cooperation ... rather
56
than interference or support.
The court's decision was issued on March 24, 1955, and its impact
on the Board was almost immediate, for one month later the Trial
Examiner in DetroitPlastics5 7 issued his Intermediate Report in a
case that involved an "Employees Representation Group" similar
to the one in Chicago Rawhide.5" He described the Group as "a
most informal organization, without any of the characteristics of
formal labor organizations; ...[but] regardless of its crudeness it
did function as a labor organization" in its dealings with the
employer regarding grievances, wages, and other working conditions.5 9 Notwithstanding that the employer had allowed the Group
to operate on company time and property and provided Christmas
parties where it presented the employees with gifts, the Trial Examiner found, on the sole authority of the just-issued Circuit decision
in Chicago Rawhide, that the employer's conduct was not violative
of section 8(a)(2).60 Quoting at length from the court's opinion,6 1
54. See generally Chicago Rawhide Mfg. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955)
(outlining these elements).
55. See id.Domination was not an issue in the case.
56. Id. at 170.
57. H.H. Erikson et al, dlb/a Detroit Plastics Prods. Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1955)
(adopting the Intermediate Report by Trial Examiner James A. Shaw, issued on Apr. 19,

1955).
58. See id.
59. Id. at 1025.
60. See id. at 1026.
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he opined that "the language of the court ...

is apropos to the

agreed. 63

situation herein."62 The Board
In numerous cases that
followed, which I shall note in their chronological order, the Board
repeatedly confirmed that Chicago Rawhide had become the applicable law defining lawful employer cooperation with an independent labor organization.'
Thus, in Hannaford Bros. Co.,6" the Board found no violation
where the employer had permitted the employees' committees to
conduct their business on company time and property. 66 And in
Remington Arms,67 previously noted, it found no violation where
the employer had paid representatives of an independent union for
time spent in negotiations with the employer.68 In Signal Oil and
Gas Co.,69 the employer permitted the labor organization to regularly use the company cafeteria for its meetings, allowed organizational elections to be held on company property, provided the
organization with office supplies and equipment (including a desk
and telephone), permitted the use of the company bulletin board,
and paid employee representatives for working time lost due to bargaining sessions and grievance meetings.70 The Board held that
"[n]either singly nor collectively are these acts or conduct violative
of the Act."7
In ManuelaManufacturingCo.,72 ChicagoRawhide was expressly
cited for the proposition that "[t]he use of company time and property does not per se support a finding of support or assistance."7 3
And in Coamo Knitting Mills, Inc.,74 citing Manuela,75 the Board
61. Including portions quoted herein above.
62. Detroit Plastics, 114 N.L.R.B. at 1026 (referring in part to the excerpts included
herein).

63. The Board's decision, issued on Nov. 16, 1955, affirmed without qualification the
Trial Examiner intermediate report, adopting his "findings, conclusions, and
recommendations." Id. at 1014.
64. See infra notes 65-97 & 102-104 and accompanying text.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

119 N.L.R.B. 1100 (1957).
See id. at 1101.
62 N.L.R.B. 611 (1945).
See id.at 614.
131 N.L.R.B. 1427 (1961).

70. See id. at 1431.
71. Id. at 1432.
72. 143 N.L.R.B. 379 (1963).
73. Id. at 385 & nn.22 & 23.

74. 150 N.L.R.B. 579 (1964).
75. See id. at 582 n.3.
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found no violation even though the cooperation included allowing
union organizational activity to occur on company time and property, for such conduct "all took place in a one-union context."7 6
The next case to recognize that an employer's contributions of
financial and other support to an in-house committee was not per se
violative of section 8(a)(2) was Heston Corp.,77 where the Trial
Examiner may have misread the significance of the Board's tacit
adoption of Chicago Rawhide, and was consequently reversed.7 8
The case involved an in-house association that had received company assistance even in excess of that which had been approved in
Chicago Rawhide. This association conducted internal union business on company time, used company facilities without its members
losing time or pay, conducted steward classes on company time and
property, and some members of its board of directors received their
regular wages for time spent attending meetings; additionally, the
company interrupted production to allow the election of stewards
on company time without employees losing pay, and it also permitted the storing of association records in a foreman's office.7 9
Promptly after Heston, the Board reaffirmed in Coastal States
Petrochemical Co."° that "the payment for meeting time, in the
same manner as for working time, cannot alone be the basis for a
finding of unlawful support ....
1
The authority of Chicago Rawhide therefore remained intact,
although now the Board had several of its own decisions to cite for
the "laudable cooperation" proposition.8 2 That is what occurred,
first in Ladish Co., 3 then again in Sunnen Products,Inc. 4 Ladish
involved committee meetings on company time and property, wage
payments for time spent on committee business, and company payment for the cost of printing the contract.85 Sunnen involved an inhouse "Employees Advisory Board" as to which the Labor Board
noted comparatively that the holding of closed meetings on com76. Id. at 582. Cf. infra note 119 (citing cases).

77. 175 N.L.R.B. 96 (1969).
78. See id. at 96.
79. See id. at 102.
80. 175 N.L.R.B. 555 (1969).

81. Id. at 556.
82. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
83. 180 N.L.R.B. 582 (1970).

84. 189 N.L.R.B. 826 (1971).
85. See Ladish Co., 180 N.L.R.B. at 583-34.
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pany time and property was "not at all unusual where affiliated
unions are involved and are not inherently coercive since they serve
to permit an otherwise legitimate labor organization to perform its
functions for the benefit of all concerned more effectively than
otherwise might be the case." 6 It is appropriate to remind ourselves that section 10(c)87 of the Act explicitly prohibits the Board
from treating outside affiliated unions more favorably than
independent inside labor organizations.
In 1979, the Board finally acknowledged, publicly, the impact of
88
Chicago Rawhide, for in Janesville Products Division, Amtel, Inc.,
it noted that it had been "apparently influenced" by this and other
appellate court decisions8 9 and now emphasized that "the Board
has more broadly held that 'fthe] use of company time and property
does not per se support a finding of support and assistance."'9
Elias Mallouk Realty Corp.91 and BASF Wyandotte Corp.92 were
the next cases in which the Board recognized that payment of regular wages to employee representatives of a labor organization for
time spent in representational duties and providing company property to assist that organization in the performance of its functions
are not unlawful, assuming that the organization, as in Chicago
Rawhide, is an entity independent of the employer's control.93 In
fact, as the Board noted in BASF Wyandotte, such payments by an
employer to union representatives, and its provision of such items
as office space and facilities, are mandatory subjects of bargain86. Sunnen, 189 N.L.R.B. at 828.

87. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
[I]n determining whether a complaint shall issue alleging a violation of subsection
(a)(1) or (a)(2) or section 158 of this title, and in deciding such cases, the same
regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective of whether or not the labor
organization affected is affiliated with a labor organization national or international
in scope.
Id.
88. 240 N.L.R.B. 854 (1979).
89. See, e.g., Coppus Eng'g Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957), setting aside 115
N.L.R.B. 1387, and NLRB v. Magic Slacks, Inc., 314 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1963), denying
enforcement of 136 N.L.R.B. 607. See also infra note 113.
90. Janesville Prods., 240 N.L.R.B. at 858 (citing Manuela Mfg. Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 379
(1963); Coamo Knitting Mills, 150 N.L.R.B. 579 (1964)) (emphasis added).
91. 265 N.L.R.B. 1225 (1982).
92. 274 N.L.R.B. 978 (1985), enforced 798 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1986).
93. See id at 980; Elias Mallouk, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1235-36.
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ing.94 Furthermore, the Board noted that the granting of such ben-

efits does not violate section 302,91 the criminal provision of the
Taft-Hartley Act that generally prohibits employers from making
"payment of money or other thing of value" to representatives of
their employees. 96 The Board emphasized that
permitting the use of company time and property in such circumstances "serve[s] to permit an otherwise legitimate labor organization to perform its functions for the benefit of all97 concerned
more effectively than otherwise might be the case."

The section 302 issue was addressed by the Third Circuit in Caterpillar,Inc. v. United Automobile Workers.98 In an en banc decision,

the court found no violation of that section when union officials,
who were company employees, were granted paid leaves of absence

pursuant to a collective bargaining contract that authorized them to
serve as full-time grievance chairmen. 99 Although that decision is
now before the Supreme Court, what is not in issue is that union
officials who are company employees that perform some work for
the employer may unquestionably be paid by the employer for their
time spent on union duties. The only issue before the Supreme
Court is whether section 302(c)(1) permits an employer to pay or
94. See BASF, 274 N.L.R.B. at 978 (citing American Ship Bldg. Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 788
(1976); Axelson, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 414 (1978), enforced 599 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1979)).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 186, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer... to pay, lend, deliver, or agree to pay,
lend, or deliver, any money or other thing of value(1) to any representative of any of his employees ... ; or
(2) to any labor organization, or any officer or employee thereof, which
represents ... any of the employees of such employer ....
(c) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable (1) in respect to any money
or thing of value payable by an employer . . .to any representative of his
employees ... who is also an employee or former employee of such employer, as
compensation for, or by reason of, his service as an employee of such employer ....
96. See BASF Wyandotte Corp., 274 N.L.R.B. 978, 979 (1985); BASF Wyandotte Corp.
v. Chemical Workers Local 227, 591 F. Supp. 339, 342 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); Employees' Indep.
Union v. Wyman Gordon Co., 314 F. Supp. 458, 461 (N.D. Ill.
1970); United States v.
Motzell, 199 F. Supp. 192, 200 (D.N.J. 1961).
97. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 274 N.L.R.B. at 980 (quoting from Sunnen Products).
98. 107 F.3d 1052 (3d Cir. 1996), cerL granted, 118 S.Ct. 31 (1997). See Brief for
Petitioner, Caterpillar, Inc. v. United Auto Workers, 118 S. Ct. 31 (1997) (No. 96-1925), for
statement of the issue on certiorari, and the district court's opinion, 909 F. Supp. 254, 255
(1995) for a full statement of facts.
99. See Caterpillar,107 F.3d at 1057.
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agree to pay the current wages of full-time union officials who are
former employees of the employer and who no longer perform any
work for the employer. The Circuit "perceive[d] no distinction
between union officials who spend part of their time (which may be
quite substantial) in adjusting
grievances from the [former] employ100
ees who are involved here."'
Regardless of how the Supreme Court rules, the Caterpillarcase
underscores the legality of employers paying their current employees for time spent in representational activities on behalf of an
independent labor organization, especially when such payments
result from a negotiated agreement with that organization. 10 1
Recent cases have reconfirmed the legality of such payments
under section 8(a)(2). In Baker Mine Services, Inc.,10 2 the Board
held that paying a labor organization's negotiating committee members for time spent in collective bargaining negotiations, which were
held on company property, does not per se establish unlawful assistance.' 3 In Electromation, the Board stated that "paying members
of a committee for their meeting time and giving that committee
space to meet and supplies is [not] per se a violation of sec.
8(a)(2)."' 4 This same principle was again reiterated by the Board's
majority opinion in Keeler Brass.' 5
Clearly, Chicago Rawhide is a non-issue that provides no reason
to amend the Act However, Chicago Rawhide and its progeny do
provide an important body of precedent that supports some of the
features that would be essential to any alternative form of worker
representation.
Now to your next concern.
Gould:
In Keeler Brass I stated my view that, inasmuch as most of the
initiative for cooperative efforts in the workplace has come from
employers, particularly in the non-union sector, we should not
conclude that the committee is unlawful simply because the
employer initiated it. I stated that the focus should be on
100.
Union,
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. (citingTrailways Lines, Inc. v. Trailways, Inc. Joint Council, Amalgamated Transit
785 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1986)).
See id. at 1056-57.
279 N.L.R.B. 609 (1986).
See id. at 610.
Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 998 n.31 (1992).
Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1118-19 (1995).
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whether the organization allows for employee action and choice
"... I would find no domination provided employees controlled

the structure and function
of the committee and their participa10 6
tion was voluntary.'
Morris:
I am pleased to respond that your view of what the law should be
actually expresses what the law already is. The Board cannot under
section 8(c)10 7 and the First Amendment' 018 deny the employer the
right to encourage its employees to organize into any lawful labor
organization, existing or proposed, affiliated or unaffiliated. The
leading case on the permissible extent of an employer's message
that encourages support of a particular labor organization is the
First Circuit's opinion enforcing the Board's order in NLRB v.
Coming Glass Works,10 9 where the court stated that
If an employer keeps within the bounds fixed by the First
Amendment and by Congress by stopping short of direct or indirect threats of reprisal or force, or promises of benefit, he cannot
be found guilty of an unfair labor practice.
[T]he First Amendment and § 8(c) give an employer the right to
express his views and opinions both orally and in other ways, and
neither draws any distinction between the scope of an employer's
right to express his views and opinions when his employees are
considering whether to unionize or not and when they are decid110
ing whether to join one union or another.
The cases have focused on whether the employees can exercise
genuine freedom of action and choice in the selection and operation
106. William B. Gould IV, Employee Participationand Labor Policy: Why the TEAM Act
Should be Defeated and the NationalLabor Relations Act Amended, 30 CREimrrON L. REv.

3, 10 (1996) (quoting Keeler Brass, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1119 (Gould, Chairman, concurring)).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c).
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be

evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.

Id.
108. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of

speech." Id.
109. 204 F.2d 422 (1st Cir. 1953).

110. Ld.
at 428.
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of their labor organization, not on whether the organization was
initiated or encouraged by the employer."' So long as the
employer's message of support or encouragement "contains no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit,"'1 2 the message is
privileged.
The most prominent court decision involving employer advocacy
of an in-house labor organization is the First Circuit's opinion in
Coppus Engineering Corp. v. NLRB," 3 where the president of the
company had called a meeting of the employees and "suggested
'that they have a permanent grievance committee, if that is what
they wanted to call it.'"14 The court held that absent non-privileged discrimination against a rival labor organization, which was
not present in the case, the president's statement only meant that
he preferred to deal with a permanent grievance committee rather
than some other type of labor organization. Therefore, "[o]nly if
'such asserted preference, with all surrounding facts and circumstances, amounts to improper influence and approaches a coercive
character' is it to be condemned."115 In the several Board cases
decided subsequent to Coppus that involved employer attempts to
initiate a labor organization, the Board has never wavered from the
1 6
application of this guarantee of free speech.
Thus, in Coamo Knitting Mills" 7 the Board expressly found no
violation in the employer's invitation to the union to organize the
employees on company premises, nor in his speech to the employees in which he encouraged them to join the union and told them
that "[tihe Company will negotiate a contract with the Union,
which we believe will be mutually beneficial.""' Moreover, numerous cases stand for the proposition that if no other union is seeking
or claiming representation, employers do not violate the Act when
they grant a union representative broad access to employees on
111. See Coppus Eng'g Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957); Corning Glass
Works, 204 F.2d 422; Coamo Knitting Mills, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 579 (1964).

112. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1994).
113. 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957). Later, in Janesville Products, 240 N.L.R.B. 854, 858
(1979), the Board credited Coppus with being one of the court decisions that had influenced
its post-Chicago Rawhide cases, such as Manuela Mfg. Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 379 (1963).
114. Coppus Eng'g Corp., 240 F.2d at 570.
115. Id. at 571 (citing Diamond T Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir.
1941)).
116. See infra notes 119-25.
117. 150 N.L.R.B. 579 (1964).
118. Id. at 595 app. A.
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company property for organizational purposes. 119 In Greyhound
Airport Service, Inc., 2 ° the Board held that an employer's sugges-

tion to employees that they think about forming their own union to
represent their interests was not a violation.' 2 '

Likewise, in

Walker's Midstream Fuel & Service Co.,"22 where the Board
expressly noted that the employer's president had "initiated the

idea of an employee committee which, if selected by the employees,
'could work out some kind of an agreement' with him,"'" 3 it found
no violation. And in MissouriHeel Co., 24 notwithstanding that an

outside union was seeking to organize the employees, the Board
found no violation when the employer told his employees: "If you
would like to get a committee together like we have done in the
past, come up with some proposals, we would be willing to listen to
1
you.' 2

Clearly, the law regarding employer initiation and encouragement of employees to join a particular labor organization-whether
in-house or otherwise-requires no amendment.
Gould:
[T]he fact is that a majority of the Board has not yet subscribed
to the views that I have expressed on employer initiatives. This is
one reason why a clarifying amendment to the statute which
would allow for employer initiatives would be appropriate.... 126

119. See New England Motor Freight, Inc., 297 N.L.R.B. 848 (1990) (holding that
employer's encouraging employees to meet with union organizer on company premises with
no supervisors present did not violate the Act); Milton Kline et al, dlb/a Kleins' Golden
Manor, 214 N.L.R.B. 807 (1974) (holding that employees' meeting with union representative
on company premises was not a violation of § 8(a)(2) where no other labor organization was
seeking to organize); Longchamps, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1973) (stating that at a meeting
with employees, employer introduced union representative, then turned the meeting over to
them so that he could explain union benefits and distribute authorization cards after the
employer and supervisors had left the room; the Board found no violation of § 8(a)(2)); Jolog
Sportswear, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 886 (1960) (allowing union representative to present an
organizational speech to employees assembled on paid time in company cafeteria did not
violate § 8(a)(2)).
120. 204 N.L.R.B. 900 (1973).
121. See id.
122. 208 N.L.R.B. 158 (1974).
123. Id. at 158.
124. 209 N.L.R.B. 481 (1974).
125. Id. at 484.
126. Gould, supra note 106, at 11.
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Morris:
In defense of your Board colleagues whom you say have failed to
subscribe to your views on employer initiatives, I would point out
that no recent Board case has raised the issue; and your having
raised it as dictum in your Keeler Brass concurring opinion is surely
no basis for concluding that a majority of the Board would not join
with you in an appropriate case, especially since your views are consistent with prior Board decisions. Because of the strong free
speech language contained in section 8(c) and the presence of the
foregoing cases, any employer so inclined already has a green light
to suggest to its employees that they organize themselves into a
committee or other entity to deal with matters affecting their
employment. So long as such entity is the free choice of the
employees and represents an uncoerced majority in an appropriate
unit, the employer may lawfully recognize and deal with it. Why fix
a provision if it ain't broke?
Gould:
I also said [in Keeler Brass] that if the employer created an
employee participation organization in response to a union organizational campaign, I would "draw the inference that the organization was designed to thwart employee independence and free
choice."
New amendments should specifically incorporate such a provision so as to avoid any ambiguity.' 27
Morris:

Here again, there is no valid basis to amend the Act. There are
many cases where employers have "created" an unlawfully dominated organization or influenced employees' committees under
such circumstances, and the Board has properly found a violation of
section 8(a)(2). 128 But if an employer encourages employees to
form or join a truly independent labor organization in preference to
an outside union, the critical tests under current law will and should
127. Gould, supra note 106, at 11 (discussing Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317
N.L.R.B. 1110, 1119 (1995)).
128. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fremont Mfg. Co., 558 F.2d 889, 891(8th Cir. 1977), enforcing224
N.L.R.B. 579 (1976); Utrad Corp. v. NLRB 454 F.2d 520, 522 (7th Cir. 1972), enforcing as
modified 185 N.L.R.B. 434 (1970); Irving Air Chute Co. v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 176, 181 (2d Cir.

1965), enforcing 149 N.L.R.B. 627 (1964); Palmas del Mar Co., 277 N.L.R.B. 71, 83 (1985);
World Wide Press, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 346 (1979); Bee Line Eng'g, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 367,374
(1975); Sportspal, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 917, 924 (1974).
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be (1) whether the preferred organization is in fact independent of
unlawful assistance or control by the employer,129 (2) whether the
employer has communicated to the employees any "threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit"'3 ° to induce their support,' 3 ' (3)
whether the employer has committed any discriminatory acts with
reference to either of the two organizations,' 32 (4) whether the recognized organization represents an uncoerced majority of the
employees 133 in an appropriate unit,'3 4 and (5) if the employer has
extended recognition to a favored organization, whether it had
knowledge of a valid petition for representation filed by the other
organization if one was filed. 35 It would be helpful, however, if
this last rule were changed to cover the time when the employer
first has knowledge of an organizational campaign, rather than
knowledge of the filing of a petition. Such a change could easily be
achieved by the Board without additional legislation. But clearly,
there is no need to change the applicable statutory language to
cover this area of the law. What is required is for the General
Counsel and the36Board to provide swift and effective enforcement
of existing law.'
Gould:
Employers ought to be able to promote the creation of and to
subsidize employee groups.
...[T]he final and most important aspect of any change should
be an assurance that such employee organizations will be autonomous, that is to say, that they can select their own representatives
129. See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann),

366 U.S. 731 (1961); NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241
(1939); Jet Spray Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. 127 (1984). See also supra note 128.
130. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1994).
131. See, e.g., Prince Macaroni Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 979 (1962), enforced, 329 F.2d 803
(1st Cir. 1964) (threatening to discharge employee who was serving "two gods" by acting for
an outside union while serving as a representative of an employees' committee violated 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)).
132. See Schlabach Coal Co. v. NLRB, 611 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1979).
133. See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann),
366 U.S. 731, 732 (1961).
134. See Atlas Guard Serv., 229 N.L.R.B. 698, 701 (1977); Northrop Corp., 187 N.L.R.B.
172, 197 (1970).
135. See Caro Bags, 285 N.L.R.B. 656,658 (1987); Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B.
955, 961 (1982). The employer's knowledge of the filing of the petition is critical. See Rollins
Transp. Sys., Inc., 296 N.L.R.B. 793 (1989).
136. See Charles . Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House - Can an Old Board Learn New
Tricks?, 24 SAN DIGO L. REv. 9 (1987).
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or leadership and determine what it is that they want to discuss
with management and how their organization should be
structured.'3 7
Morris:

I fully agree, but as I have demonstrated, the law already provides for all of that. I appreciate, however, your having raised these
important issues because our dialogue, and the research on which it
is based, have revealed the nature of the problems that are involved
in the establishment of any program of alternative employee representation. In the first place, the state of the law is such that employers who in good faith may wish to encourage their employees to
create independent forms of representation should know that they
may do so legally and that amendments to section 8(a)(2) are not
required. Existing law adequately permits the creation of such nontraditional labor organizations. In the second place, so long as an
employer understands a few simple legal requirements and acts
accordingly, it may achieve the creation of an employee representational entity that is markedly different from a traditional labor
union. Those basic requirements-to name only the ones that history teaches are the most likely to be violated-are that the
employer (1) cannot coerce or require the employees to select an
organization as their representative-that selection must be their
own free choice, 3 8 (2) cannot dictate the organization's structure 39
or how it functions,'140 and (3) cannot control-directly or indirectly-the selection of the organization's officers or representa142
tives 141 or otherwise actively participate in its internal affairs.
137. William B. Gould IV, Employee Participationand Labor Policy: Why the TEAM Act

Should be Defeated and the National Labor Relations Act Amended, 30 CREHTON L. REv.
3, 11 (1996).
138. See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann),
366 U.S. 731 (1961); NLRB v. Vernitron Elec. Components, Inc., 548 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1977),
enforcing 221 N.L.R.B. 464 (1975); Prince Macaroni Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 979, 980 (1962).
139. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241 (1939); NLRB v.

Fremont Mfg. Co., 558 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1977); Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317
N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995).
140. See Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995); St. Vincent's Hosp.,
244 N.L.R.B. 84 (1979); Rennselaer Polytechnic Inst., 219 N.L.R.B. 712 (1975).
141. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992); see, e.g., NLRB v. Webcor
Packaging, Inc., 118 F.3d 1115 (6th Cir. 1997); Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B.
1110 (1995).
142. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992); see, e.g., NLRB v. Webcor
Packaging, Inc., 118 F.3d 1115 (6th Cir. 1997); Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B.

1110 (1995).
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Engaging in such practices would compromise the independence of
that labor organization and thus violate section 8(a)(2).
Our dialogue has accordingly revealed that viable alternative
employee representational structures can be encouraged and developed under the NLRA as it now stands, but we must look to the
General Counsel and the Board to ensure that this law is enforced
in a manner that will encourage true employer cooperation, yet
draw the line in those cases where an employer seeks to control the
labor organization in question. The educational and enforcement
process in this regard would be substantially enhanced if the Board
were to promulgate clarifying rules pursuant to its general rulemaking authority and the specific proviso in section 8(a)(2). 143
We must not forget, however, that the legal principles to which
we make reference are ultimately derived from the Congressional
mandate that guarantees employees the "right to self-organization
...and

to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....,144 Thus, the

right to organize at the workplace, whether in a traditional labor
union or in an alternative representational structure, is a right that
belongs only to employees, 45 not to the employer. But whether a
representational structure is initiated by the employer or the
employees, if it conforms to the requirements of employee independence discussed herein, it will help fill an indisputable need in most
American workplaces. That need is so great that even spokespersons for organized labor have recognized that nonunion solutions
are possible and even suitable if they meet this independence
requirement. As Jonathan Hiat146 told the Senate Committee when
he expressed the AFL-CIO's opposition to the TEAM Act:
Employees in both unionized and non-unionized workplaces
should have a voice in the workplace, and it should be their
authentic voice, advanced by genuine and independent representatives selected by them, whether or not those representatives

143. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
144. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
145. See generally Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A
Glimpse at a General Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1673, 1729 (1989)
(discussing the scope and purpose of 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994)).
146. Mr. Hiat is the General Counsel of the AFL-CIO.
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formally go by the name "union,". "association," or even
"committee.", 4 7

On that positive note, I bring this dialogue to a close.

147. Selected Testimony Before Senate Labor And Human Resources Committee Hearing
on TEAM ACT (S. 295), Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Feb. 13, 1997, at D26. Hiat elaborated on
the meaning of "independent":
what the ... Seventh Circuit said in 1994 in upholding the NLRB's decision in the
Electromation case: representatives who enjoy the "unfettered power . . . to
determine [their] own actions." Independent representatives are selected by, and
accountable to, the employees alone. Independent representatives are free to
determine, on their own, their positions and their agenda. And, independent
representatives do not exist at the sufferance of management.
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